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12 September 1974

	MEMORANDUM FOR	.:		
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	SUBJECT	: Requirements		
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	Attachments: (2)			
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NSA Review Completed.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

14-4707

Serial: N0899 27 August 1974

The Honorable William E. Colby Director of Central Intelligence CIA Headquarters Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I have been given the opportunity to review a draft of your proposed letter of instruction to the Chairman, SIGINT Committee. I heartily endorse the idea of giving the committee chairmen clear instructions regarding the role you expect them to play and the problems you wish them to specifically address. However, I am concerned that the thrust of the letter as regards "requirements" has a major shortcoming.

The SIGINT Committee is essentially an assemblage of SIGINT experts from the elements of the community. There are many functions they can perform for USIB but they are not the proper mechanism to identify SIGINT requirements based on substantive needs. The missing element of the process is a mechanism which views all sources of intelligence which can contribute to a substantive need and identifies the unique and necessary needs for SIGINT. Consultation with the NIOs is not strong enough, for it implies that the responsibility for the judgment is still in the functional area. That responsibility must be clearly assigned to some "all source" mechanism. The NIOs could be such a mechanism but perhaps there are other schemes you wish to consider.

I am so concerned about this point because I believe that most other aspects of the process are working pretty well and can be made to work better. But this fundamental flaw has been with us for a long time and will not be solved within the historic process.

Sincerely

LEW ALLEN, JR.

Lieutenant General, USAF

Director

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SIGINT COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

10 September	1974
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Maj Gen USAF (Ret.)
Intelligence Community Staff
CIA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.


Dear Jack:

I have considered the matter raised by Gen. Allen in his letter of 27 August to Mr. Colby regarding the handling of requirements as described in the proposed Letter of Instruction for the Chairman of the SIGINT Committee. It seems logical that an orderly transition from community intelligence requirements to SIGINT guidance should include an intermediate step in which someone or some body determines that a particular intelligence discipline is the most likely source of the information to fill a particular intelligence need. The body who would perform such a function should be equipped with knowledge and experience in the capabilities and limitations of each of the intelligence disciplines. I happen to think that an experienced SIGINT person or body is best equipped to determine the likelihood and relative cost of acquiring particular information from SIGINT sources. I would have to guess that the same is true in the Imagery and HUMINT areas. If the validity of that point is accepted it seems to me that the DCI would be well served by a "clearing house" comprising at least one each experienced SIGINT, HUMINT and Imagery professional to decide among themselves which discipline should be considered the prime source for any given requirement or part thereof and in which the other disciplines might play a secondary role, if at all. My perception of the NIO body as somewhat different than Gen. Allen's and I do not believe that they are equipped to determine the most effective sources of information. Each may be able to make some judgments in some cases but I do not believe as presently constituted they are the most qualified body to decide which collection sources should be engaged to meet particular intelligence needs. To come to grips with the problem raised by Gen. Allen and expressed on previous occasions by others, it might be well to get on with a trial

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mechanism to get a real feel for what will be involved in making source decisions. It has been suggested in the past that the mechanism might comprise the Chairmen of COMIREX, Human Sources and the SIGINT Committee with someone like George Carver in charge. This is about as good a place to start as any. We might also include the Secretaries of the three committees. I am inclimed to favor this approach because it places in the loop key representatives of the three USIB bodies that will ultimately be involved in the issuance of guidance to the various collectors.



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